SA Fried Chicken Co. Business Plan — Financial Plan

Section 12 · 12 of 18

Financial Plan

This section presents the full three-statement financial plan on the independent underwriting basis: a normalised revenue ramp, full depreciation and cash interest, and South African corporate tax at 27% with assessed-loss carry-forward. The balance sheet ties to zero in every year of the projection.

Modelling posture & key assumptions

The model preserves the sponsor’s mature unit-volume and operating ambitions at the revenue line, then re-derives everything below independently. Revenue is built bottom-up from a store cohort model: each cohort of new stores ramps from ~60% of mature productivity in its opening year to full maturity by month 18, with same-store growth thereafter. This is the single most important departure from the brief’s headline trajectory — and the reason modelled early-year revenue sits below the sponsor’s figures.

Assumption

Basis

Value

Mature AUV — flagship

Per store, annual

R12.5m

Mature AUV — express

Per store, annual

R6.8m

Ramp curve

Opening yr / yr2 / yr3+

60% / 82% / 93% → 100%

Same-store sales growth

Post-maturity

5.0% p.a.

Food cost (COGS)

% of revenue, improving

35.5% → 34.0%

Mature four-wall EBITDA

% of revenue

~22.7%

Corporate overhead

Fixed + brand marketing

R14m → R28m + ~2.4–3.0%

Store fixed capex

Depreciable, per store

R4.5m (7-yr life)

Cost of debt

Blended term + asset finance

12.5%

Corporate tax

SA rate; 80% assessed-loss cap

27%

NoteWhere this model is deliberately more conservative than the brief

Three levers drive the gap to the sponsor’s headline: (1) a realistic ramp curve (FY2026 revenue R75m vs sponsor R120m); (2) full rollout depreciation and cash interest below EBITDA; and (3) a commissary and corporate overhead the brief under-provides for. The result is a plan that is slower and more capital-hungry than the brief — but one a credit committee can actually underwrite.

Unit economics

The estate’s viability rests on the four-wall economics of a single mature store. Per R100 of sales, food and packaging absorb ~R34, store labour ~R20, and the remaining store operating costs (occupancy, delivery commissions, utilities, local marketing and maintenance) a further ~R23 — leaving mature store-level EBITDA of roughly R22.70 before any central overhead.

Figure 8. Mature four-wall unit economics per R100 of revenue.

Each store crosses its own break-even at the store-contribution level within the first year of trading, well before the estate as a whole turns net-profit-positive. The chart below traces a flagship’s monthly revenue against cost from opening to maturity.

Figure 9. Store-level break-even trajectory for a flagship outlet.

Mature per-store profit & loss

The table sets out the full mature four-wall P&L for each format. Both formats converge on ~22.7% store-level EBITDA — the express format’s smaller absolute contribution is offset by its materially lower capital cost and its strategic role in reach and community presence.

R’m per store, at maturity

Flagship

% rev

Express

% rev

Revenue

12.50

100.0

6.80

100.0

Cost of goods sold

(4.25)

34.0

(2.31)

34.0

Gross profit

8.25

66.0

4.49

66.0

Labour

(2.50)

20.0

(1.36)

20.0

Occupancy

(1.06)

8.5

(0.58)

8.5

Delivery commissions

(0.67)

5.4

(0.37)

5.4

Utilities

(0.44)

3.5

(0.24)

3.5

Local marketing

(0.35)

2.8

(0.19)

2.8

Repairs & other

(0.39)

3.1

(0.21)

3.1

Store-level EBITDA

2.84

22.7

1.54

22.7

Figure 10. Average unit volume ramp curve by format — maturity at ~18 months.
Figure 11. Mature cost structure at FY2030 (% of revenue).

Revenue build

Applying the cohort ramp to the 50-store rollout produces the normalised revenue trajectory below, shown against the sponsor’s headline. Convergence is delayed roughly 24 months by the ramp; by FY2030 the estate generates ~R460m.

Figure 12. Revenue — sponsor headline vs independent normalised underwriting.

R’m (FY end Feb)

FY2026

FY2027

FY2028

FY2029

FY2030

Flagship revenue

75.0

147.5

215.3

283.5

353.1

Express revenue

0.0

16.3

42.7

73.6

107.1

Total revenue

75

164

258

357

460

— dine-in

25.5

52.4

77.4

103.6

128.9

— takeaway

34.5

73.7

113.5

153.5

193.3

— delivery

15.0

37.7

67.1

100.0

138.1

Sponsor headline (memo)

120

250

400

520

640

Projected profit & loss statement

The full income statement re-derives every line below revenue. EBITDA turns positive in FY2027; net profit turns positive in FY2029 as depreciation and interest are progressively covered by a maturing estate.

R’m (FY end Feb)

FY2026

FY2027

FY2028

FY2029

FY2030

Revenue

75

164

258

357

460

Cost of goods sold

(26.6)

(57.3)

(89.0)

(122.1)

(156.5)

Gross profit

48.4

106.5

169.0

235.0

303.8

Store operating expenses

(35.5)

(74.6)

(114.2)

(155.5)

(199.3)

Store-level EBITDA

12.8

31.9

54.7

79.5

104.5

Corporate overhead

(16.3)

(22.6)

(28.7)

(34.9)

(39.0)

EBITDA

-3.4

9.3

26.0

44.6

65.4

Depreciation

(5.1)

(14.0)

(21.3)

(28.6)

(35.9)

Pre-opening costs

(5.0)

(5.0)

(5.0)

(5.0)

(5.0)

EBIT

-13.5

-9.8

-0.2

11.0

24.5

Net interest

(2.7)

(5.4)

(7.4)

(7.4)

(11.0)

Profit before tax

-16.2

-15.2

-7.6

3.6

13.5

Tax (27%, loss carry-fwd)

(0.0)

(0.0)

(0.0)

(0.2)

(0.7)

Net profit / (loss)

-16.2

-15.2

-7.6

3.4

12.7

EBITDA margin %

-4.6%

5.7%

10.1%

12.5%

14.2%

Net margin %

-21.6%

-9.3%

-3.0%

1.0%

2.8%

Figure 13. Margin ladder — gross, store EBITDA, company EBITDA and net margin.
Figure 14. EBITDA and EBITDA margin by year.

Key findingEBITDA margin ≈ 14%; net margin ≈ 3% — the distinction is the whole story

The sponsor’s “12–15% net margin after stabilisation” conflates two different measures. The model reaches a ~14% company EBITDA margin by FY2030 — genuinely healthy for QSR — but net margin is only ~2.8%, because a capital-intensive rollout carries heavy depreciation and interest during the build phase. Net margin expands toward the sponsor’s range only beyond FY2030, as capex intensity falls relative to revenue and leverage unwinds. Underwriting on EBITDA, not on a premature net-margin claim, is the correct posture.

Projected balance sheet

The balance sheet reflects a PP&E-heavy rollout funded by phased equity and scaling debt. Book equity remains positive throughout — the direct result of restructuring the single R50m injection into a phased R130m programme. The statement ties to zero in every year.

R’m (FY end Feb)

FY2026

FY2027

FY2028

FY2029

FY2030

Assets

Property, plant & equipment

70.9

113.9

138.6

169.0

179.1

Inventory

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

Receivables

0.5

1.0

1.6

2.2

2.8

Cash & equivalents

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

Total assets

81.4

129.9

160.2

196.2

211.9

Liabilities

Trade payables

2.2

4.7

7.3

10.0

12.9

Total debt

45.4

61.5

61.9

91.7

91.9

Total liabilities

47.6

66.3

69.2

101.8

104.8

Equity

Share capital

50.0

95.0

130.0

130.0

130.0

Retained earnings

-16.2

-31.3

-39.0

-35.5

-22.8

Total equity

33.8

63.7

91.0

94.5

107.2

Balance check (A−L−E)

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Balance check is zero in every year — the model is internally consistent and enforced by assertion in the build.

Figure 15. Balance-sheet composition, equity and total debt over the plan horizon.

Projected cash-flow statement

Operating cash flow turns positive in FY2028 and funds an increasing share of growth capex thereafter. Investing outflows reflect the store rollout and commissary; financing inflows reflect the phased equity tranches and debt draws. A minimum cash balance of R5m is maintained throughout.

R’m (FY end Feb)

FY2026

FY2027

FY2028

FY2029

FY2030

Net profit / (loss)

-16.2

-15.2

-7.6

3.4

12.7

Add back: depreciation

5.1

14.0

21.3

28.6

35.9

Working-capital movement

(3.3)

(3.0)

(3.0)

(2.9)

(2.8)

Cash from operations

-14.4

-4.2

10.7

29.1

45.8

Capital expenditure

-76.0

-57.0

-46.0

-59.0

-46.0

Cash from investing

-76.0

-57.0

-46.0

-59.0

-46.0

Equity injections

50.0

45.0

35.0

0.0

0.0

Net debt movement

45.4

16.2

0.3

29.9

0.2

Cash from financing

95.4

61.2

35.3

29.9

0.2

Closing cash

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

Figure 16. Cash-flow profile by activity (operating / investing / financing).

Cumulative free cash flow reaches its trough during the build phase before the maturing estate begins to self-fund. This trough defines the peak external funding the plan must raise — the number a financier is truly underwriting.

Figure 17. Cumulative free cash flow and peak funding requirement.

Monthly phasing — FY2026

Because Year 1 carries the full ramp, monthly phasing matters for cash management. The table shows modelled monthly revenue for FY2026 as the ten flagship stores open progressively and ramp. Revenue builds from a low base in the opening months to a run-rate exiting the year that annualises well above the R75m full-year figure — the reason FY2027 steps up sharply.

FY2026 (R’m)

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

M6

M7

M8

M9

M10

M11

M12

Revenue

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.9

3.1

4.5

6.1

7.8

9.7

11.7

13.9

16.3

Stores open between months 3 and 11; each ramps individually, so the estate exits FY2026 at a materially higher run-rate than its full-year average.

Quarterly build — FY2026 & FY2027

R’m

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

FY total

FY2026

Revenue

12.0

16.5

21.0

25.5

75

EBITDA

-0.5

-0.8

-1.0

-1.2

-3.4

Net profit / (loss)

-2.6

-3.6

-4.5

-5.5

-16.2

FY2027

Revenue

34.4

39.3

44.2

45.9

164

EBITDA

2.0

2.2

2.5

2.6

9.3

Net profit / (loss)

-3.2

-3.6

-4.1

-4.2

-15.2

Capital structure & funding plan

The full five-year programme requires ~R284m of capital expenditure. Funded conservatively, this implies an equity programme of ~R130m (R50m Tranche 1 plus ~R80m follow-on across FY2027–FY2028) and senior/asset-finance debt scaling to ~R90m. The Phase-1 sources and uses, the capital stack, and the capital-requirement bridge are shown below.

Phase-1 sources & uses of funds

The formal sources-and-uses statement reconciles the true Phase-1 requirement against committed funding. The uses restore the items the brief omits — most materially the central commissary — while the sources make explicit that the R50m sponsor equity is one component of a larger stack, not the whole of it.

Phase-1 capital plan (R’m)

R’m

% of total

Uses of funds

Store fit-out & equipment (10 stores)

45.0

46%

Central commissary (lean build)

25.0

26%

Head office, IT & POS platform

6.0

6%

Inventory & launch working capital

12.0

12%

Pre-opening (marketing + training)

5.0

5%

Contingency (4.5%)

4.2

4%

Total Phase-1 requirement

97.2

100%

Sources of funds

Sponsor equity (as per brief)

50.0

51%

Senior term facility (asset-backed)

33.0

34%

Equipment / asset finance

10.0

10%

Residual — tranche sizing / early operating cash

4.2

4%

Total sources

97.2

100%

Committed equity and debt of ~R93m meet ~96% of the true R97.2m Phase-1 requirement; the ~R4.2m residual is absorbed by tranche sizing and early operating cash. The point stands: the R50m headline funds roughly half of Phase 1.

Figure 18. Phase-1 capital stack — uses vs sources.

The bridge below traces the same point in a different form: from the brief’s implied R60m (ten stores at R6.0m) to the true Phase-1 requirement of ~R97m once the omitted commissary, head-office platform, launch working capital, pre-opening and contingency are restored. The R47m difference between that requirement and the R50m equity is the funding gap the debt facility closes.

Figure 19. Capital-requirement bridge — from the brief’s figure to the true Phase-1 need.

Across the full programme, leverage is highest early — when EBITDA is still thin — and then falls sharply as the estate matures. Net-debt/EBITDA peaks above 6× in FY2027 before deleveraging to a comfortable ~1.3× by FY2030. This trajectory is characteristic of a funded rollout and is why the coverage covenants are set to the ramp rather than to a single steady-state threshold.

Figure 20. Net debt and leverage — peak then deleveraging to 1.3× by FY2030.

Debt-service coverage follows the same shape. The chart below shows DSCR against both the 1.0× floor and the proposed 1.3× steady-state covenant — the visual case for the grace period and reserve account discussed next.

Figure 21. Debt-service coverage ratio by year against the 1.0× floor and 1.3× covenant.

Analyst flagDSCR sits below 1.0× in the ramp — structure for it

Debt-service coverage is below 1.0× in FY2026 and around 1.0× in FY2027, before recovering strongly to above 2× from FY2028. This is normal for a leveraged rollout but must be structured explicitly: an 18–24 month interest-only / grace period on the senior facility, a funded debt-service reserve account (DSRA), and covenants set to the ramp rather than to steady-state. A lender who ignores the early-year coverage gap — or a sponsor who assumes it away — is mispricing the risk.

Covenant dashboard

The proposed covenant package is set to the ramp, not to steady state, with headroom that tightens as the estate matures. A funded debt-service reserve (six months of debt service) sits alongside the grace period. The dashboard shows the modelled position against each proposed covenant.

Covenant / metric

FY2026

FY2027

FY2028

FY2029

FY2030

EBITDA (R’m)

-3.4

9.3

26.0

44.6

65.4

Interest cover (×)

-1.3×

1.7×

3.5×

6.0×

5.9×

DSCR — actual (×)

-1.27×

0.99×

2.10×

3.34×

3.63×

DSCR — covenant min

grace

1.00×

1.30×

1.30×

1.30×

Net debt / EBITDA — actual

n/a

6.1×

2.2×

1.9×

1.3×

Leverage — covenant max

n/a

n/a

4.0×

3.5×

3.0×

DSRA balance (R’m)

1.3

4.7

6.2

6.7

9.0

An interest-only grace period applies in FY2026–FY2027; DSCR and leverage covenants take effect from FY2028 with headroom to the modelled base case.

Key financial ratios summary

The ratio summary consolidates the plan’s profitability, leverage and return profile in one view. The trajectory is the story: margins build as the estate matures, gearing peaks during the funded rollout and then falls, and returns on capital turn firmly positive from FY2028 as operating leverage arrives.

Ratio

FY2026

FY2027

FY2028

FY2029

FY2030

Growth & profitability

Revenue growth (YoY)

118%

57%

38%

29%

Gross margin

64.5%

65.0%

65.5%

65.8%

66.0%

EBITDA margin

-4.6%

5.7%

10.1%

12.5%

14.2%

Net profit margin

-21.6%

-9.3%

-3.0%

1.0%

2.8%

Leverage & returns

Net debt / EBITDA

n/a

6.1×

2.2×

1.9×

1.3×

Gearing (net debt / equity)

119%

89%

62%

92%

81%

Return on capital employed

-17.0%

-7.8%

-0.2%

5.9%

12.3%

Ratios are derived from the independent base case. Net margin turns positive in FY2029 and EBITDA margin reaches ~14% by FY2030 — the underwriting anchor — while the sponsor’s 20–25% net-return ambition is a post-horizon, scaled-estate outcome.

Returns & investor economics

On the independent base case, the R130m equity programme returns a five-year IRR of 33% and a 3.4× MOIC at an assumed 8× EV/EBITDA exit — comfortably above the sponsor’s 20–25% target, though the outcome is materially sensitive to the exit multiple. The table and chart set out that sensitivity.

Exit EV/EBITDA

8× (base)

10×

11×

Exit enterprise value (R’m)

393

458

523

589

654

720

Less net debt (R’m)

(87)

(87)

(87)

(87)

(87)

(87)

Equity value (R’m)

306

371

436

502

567

633

5-yr equity IRR

22.7%

28.4%

33.4%

37.8%

41.7%

45.3%

Figure 22. Five-year equity IRR by exit multiple, against the sponsor’s 25% target.

Key findingReturns are attractive but exit-multiple-dependent and leverage-amplified

The base-case IRR clears the sponsor’s hurdle at every plausible exit multiple from 6× upward. But two caveats govern the number: returns are amplified by leverage (which cuts both ways), and equity value is a residual after net debt, so the outcome is sensitive to both the exit multiple and the pace of deleveraging. A disciplined investor underwrites the 6–7× downside multiple, not the 10–11× upside, and treats the franchise-led capital-light path as the primary way to protect the multiple by improving return-on-capital.