Switchpoint Payments Business Plan — Market and Regulatory Context

The South African payments landscape, PayShap and account-to-account rails, and the regulatory framework a payment service provider operates within.

Market and Regulatory Context

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  • 3.1 The National Payment System
  • 3.2 Interchange and the direction of card pricing
  • 3.3 Real-time credit-push infrastructure
  • 3.4 Competitive landscape

3.1 The National Payment System

Payment activity in South Africa is governed by the National Payment System Act 78 of 1998 and overseen by the National Payment System Department of the South African Reserve Bank. The architecture has a defining characteristic for any non-bank participant: clearing and settlement are bank functions. A non-bank may operate within the system as a system operator, a third-party payment provider, or a payment clearing house participant of various descriptions, but it cannot settle in central bank money in its own name.

The practical consequence is that Switchpoint must contract with a settlement bank that sponsors its participation, provides settlement finality, and assumes regulatory responsibility for the flows Switchpoint introduces. The sponsor bank will require indemnities, collateral or a settlement guarantee, transaction monitoring rights, and audit access. It will also charge for the privilege — a cost embedded in the modelled cost of payments.

3.2 Interchange and the direction of card pricing

Interchange in South Africa is not set bilaterally between acquirers and issuers; it is determined through a regulator-led process, with rates published by transaction type and differentiated by whether the card is debit or credit, whether the transaction is card-present or card-not-present, and whether the merchant meets certain qualification criteria. For an acquirer this has two implications: interchange is a cost that cannot be negotiated away, and the qualification criteria create a real incentive to invest in the technical standards that attract lower rates.

Net take rate by rail
Figure 6. Net take rate by rail.

FY2027

FY2028

FY2029

FY2030

FY2031

Card merchant discount rate

2.45%

2.40%

2.35%

2.30%

2.26%

Card cost of payments

1.41%

1.39%

1.37%

1.35%

1.33%

Card net take rate, basis points

104

101

98

95

93

Account-to-account cost per transaction

R2.40

R2.30

R2.15

R2.05

R1.95

Account-to-account net take rate, basis points

30

30

30

30

30

Blended net take rate, basis points

64

60

59

58

56

3.3 Real-time credit-push infrastructure

Measure

Figure

Relevance

Transactions, December 2025

60 million

Worth R62 billion in that month alone

Cumulative transactions to December 2025

461 million

Passing 900 million by mid-2026

Cumulative value to December 2025

R403 billion

At an average transaction size of about R874

Monthly volume, first 33 months

About 14 million

Accelerating to about 89 million in the five months to May 2026

Registered users

6 million

Per-transaction limit

R50 000

Raised from R3 000 in August 2024

Request-to-pay capability

December 2024

Enables person-to-merchant payment initiation by the merchant

Reserve Bank stake in the operating entity

50%

Acquired October 2025

Real-time payments market, 2025

US$0.57 billion

Forecast at US$2.75 billion by 2030, a 34.21% compound rate

Person-to-person share of 2024 volume

68%

Person-to-business flows growing faster at 35.1%

The rail this plan is built on
Figure 7. The rail this plan is built on.

For merchant acceptance the request-to-pay flow is the significant development. It gives the merchant a payment initiated from their own system, with a structured reference the merchant controls, confirmation of irrevocable settlement within seconds, and no card scheme in the middle. It removes the proof-of-payment problem, the reconciliation lag and the release-before-clearance credit decision at once.

3.4 Competitive landscape

Layer

Participants

Position relative to Switchpoint

Bank acquirers

The major commercial banks, operating full-service merchant acquiring alongside the banking relationship

Incumbent in the trade segment through existing banking relationships. Competes on relationship, not product. Slow to integrate with third-party vertical software

Scale small-merchant acquirers

Hardware-led providers serving the general small and micro-merchant market at scale

Not a direct competitor in the trade segment. Formidable and well-capitalised in the practice segment. Switchpoint competes there on software integration, not price or hardware

Online payment gateways

Card-not-present gateways and aggregators serving e-commerce

Adjacent. Limited presence at physical trade counters and in practice management workflows

Account-to-account specialists

Providers offering bank-to-bank payment initiation, principally for online checkout

The closest competitive threat on the account-to-account rail. Generally consumer-checkout oriented rather than embedded in merchant back-office systems

Vertical software vendors themselves

Practice management and enterprise resource planning vendors monetising payments directly

A partner today and a potential competitor at renewal. The 18% revenue share is the price of that alignment

Porter's Five Forces intensity assessment
Figure 8. Porter's Five Forces intensity assessment.

Supplier power scores highest at 4.5, and in this industry that means the sponsor bank and the rail operator rather than a conventional supplier. Both set prices Switchpoint cannot negotiate and both can withdraw. Buyer power follows at 4.0 because the integration partner, not the merchant, effectively controls the relationship at renewal. The threat of new entrants is the lowest force at 3.0 — not because capital is scarce but because sponsorship, scheme registration and PCI DSS Level 1 attestation together take the better part of a year and cannot be compressed.

The defensible position is narrow and should be stated as such: Switchpoint is competitive where the merchant relationship is mediated by vertical software and where the payment mix requires both a card rail and a capped-fee high-ticket rail behind one settlement and reconciliation layer. Outside that intersection it has no structural advantage.