Highveld Detailing Business Plan — Channel Economics: Where the Capital Should Go
Which channels earn their capital and which do not, and how that shapes the roll-out.
Section 13 of 38
Channel Economics: Where the Capital Should Go
Jump to section
- 0. Basis of Preparation and Important Notice
- 1. Executive Summary
- 2. Investment Thesis
- 3. What Must Be True, and What Would Break the Thesis
- 4. Company, Structure and Governance
- 5. The Customer Problem and the Value Proposition
- 6. Service Portfolio, Pricing and Contribution
- 7. Industry Structure and Profitability
- 8. Market Sizing and the Addressable Opportunity
- 9. Customer Segments and Buying Behaviour
- 10. Competitive Landscape
- 11. Business Model and Revenue Architecture
- 12. Channel Economics: Where the Capital Should Go
- 13. Go-to-Market Strategy
- 14. Operating Model
- 15. People and Organisation
- 16. Strategic Plan
- 17. SWOT and Strategic Implications
- 18. Risk Analysis
- 19. ESG, Transformation and Development Impact
- 20. Implementation Roadmap
- 21. Financial Assumptions
- 22. Cost Structure and Operating Leverage
- 23. Projected Income Statement
- 24. Projected Balance Sheet
- 25. Projected Cash Flow
- 26. Capital Expenditure
- 27. Funding Requirement and Structure
- 28. Debt Serviceability
- 29. Break-even Analysis
- 30. Valuation and Investor Returns
- 31. Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
- 32. Key Performance Indicators and Management Dashboard
- 33. Exit Strategy
- 34. Conclusion and Recommendation
- A. Appendix A: Detailed Assumptions Register
- B. Appendix B: Roll-out Schedule
- C. Appendix C: Model Integrity Verification
This section contains the analysis that determined the shape of the entire plan. Read on margin, the studio is the best business Highveld operates. Read on return on capital, it is the worst. The plan follows the second reading.
Full unit economics at steady state
Table 23. Unit economics by channel, FY2031 steady state, before head-office allocation
|
Per unit per month unless stated |
Detailing studio |
In-dealership unit |
Mobile fleet unit |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Vehicles processed |
447 |
492 |
222 |
|
Revenue |
R1,067k |
R176k |
R94k |
|
Revenue per vehicle |
R2,385 |
R357 |
R423 |
|
Annual revenue |
R12.80m |
R2.11m |
R1.12m |
|
Annual EBITDA |
R4.71m |
R0.55m |
R0.38m |
|
EBITDA margin |
36.8% |
26.1% |
33.6% |
|
Capital cost |
R5.93m |
R0.32m |
R0.62m |
|
Annual EBITDA per rand of capital |
0.79x |
1.72x |
0.61x |
|
Cash payback on unit capital |
1.3 years |
0.6 years |
1.6 years |
|
Full-time employees |
13.9 |
6.4 |
2.0 |
|
Units operating in FY2032 |
2 |
28 |
6 |
Studio capital includes leasehold improvements, plant and equipment, solar photovoltaic with battery storage, water reclamation, brand and IT. In-dealership capital is equipment and mobilisation only, because the dealer provides premises, water and power.
The decision this analysis forced
The first version of this plan proposed three studios opening in successive years and no embedded channel at all. It produced a cash shortfall approaching R74 million, a head-office burden that never became affordable, and returns below the cost of capital in every scenario including the upside. The analysis above explains why in one line: a studio consumes roughly R5.93m of capital to produce R4.71m of annual EBITDA, while an embedded unit consumes R0.32m to produce R0.55m.
Table 24. Capital allocation under the rejected and adopted plans
|
Studio-led plan (rejected) |
Adopted plan |
Difference |
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
Studios by year five |
3 |
2 |
(1) |
|
Embedded units by year five |
None |
28 |
+28 |
|
Approximate capital in studios |
R17.8m |
R5.9m + R6.2m |
Lower |
|
Capital in embedded units |
None |
R11.2m |
Higher, but more productive |
|
Indicative FY2032 revenue |
Around R38m |
R89.0m |
Materially higher |
|
Indicative FY2032 EBITDA margin |
Higher per vehicle |
11.4% |
Lower margin, higher return |
|
Return on capital |
Below cost of capital |
33.4% project IRR |
Decisive |
The rejected plan is described qualitatively; it was not carried forward as a modelled scenario. It is included because the reasoning that eliminated it is the reasoning that justifies the plan that replaced it.
Why two studios are retained rather than none
If embedded units are so much more capital-efficient, the logical conclusion appears to be that Highveld should build no studios at all. The modelling does not support that either, for three reasons that are commercial rather than financial.
- Paint protection cannot be applied on a forecourt. Ceramic coating and film application require a dust-controlled, temperature-stable, well-lit environment. Without a studio, Highveld forfeits the two highest-contribution lines in the portfolio, R752 and R818 of contribution per labour hour respectively, and with them the margin that carries the head office.
- The academy needs a home. Every embedded detailer is trained at a studio before deployment. Training on a live dealer forecourt is not viable: the vehicles belong to the customer and mistakes are expensive. The academy is the mechanism that solves the labour constraint, and it requires a facility.
- Dealer principals buy what they can inspect. The enterprise sales process depends on bringing a dealer principal to a facility that visibly operates to a higher standard than their own wash bay. A contractor without a flagship is competing on a rate card alone, which is the competition Highveld is designed to avoid.