Aurex Corridor Logistics Group Business Plan — Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

Aurex Corridor Logistics Group is a vertically integrated logistics, rail and terminal-infrastructure company designed to address one of Africa’s most binding economic constraints: high-cost, fragmented, road-dependent supply chains. The Company will develop and operate inland container depots, rail-linked freight corridors, dry-bulk export terminals, logistics parks and bonded warehouses, cross-border consolidation hubs and a digital freight-visibility platform, replicating and extending the Grindrod-style integrated logistics model across the Zambia–South Africa–Mozambique–Namibia trade corridors.

The Company seeks US$180 million of development-finance, infrastructure-equity and commercial capital for the Phase 1–3 rollout. On the sponsor’s ten-year projections, preserved in this Document, revenue grows from $20 million to $550 million, with the EBITDA margin building from 10% to 33% as terminal, rail, warehousing, customs and digital revenue layers mature and asset utilisation rises.

1.1 The opportunity

Figure 1.1 African logistics inefficiency — the structural opportunity

African logistics costs run at 14–18% of GDP against a global average near 8%, rail carries under 15% of freight in most corridors, and road handles over 80% of movement at far higher cost per ton-kilometre. Aurex’s rail-first, corridor-control model targets this structural inefficiency, anchored by predictable mining-export base-load (copper, cobalt, manganese), agricultural exports and FMCG imports into landlocked regions.

1.2 The funding request

Source

Instrument

Amount

DFIs (DBSA, AfDB, IDC-type)

Senior debt

$80m

Private-equity infrastructure funds

Equity

$60m

Strategic logistics partners

Equity / JV

$25m

Commercial banks

Working-capital facilities

$15m

Total Phase 1-3 funding

$180m

Table 1.1 Proposed capital stack (sponsor-specified).

The stack is 47% equity-funded ($85m of $180m), an appropriately robust equity base for a green-field infrastructure programme that must absorb several years of negative cash flow before turning. Capital funds inland container depots ($45m), rail-linked terminals ($50m), a bulk export terminal ($35m), logistics parks ($25m), fleet ($15m), the digital platform ($5m) and initial working capital ($5m).

1.3 Headline financials (selected years)

US$ million

Year 1

Year 3

Year 5

Year 7

Year 10

Revenue

20

85

180

310

550

EBITDA

2

15

41

87

182

EBITDA margin

10%

18%

23%

28%

33%

Net profit (re-underwritten)

-6

-4

12

34

101

Unlevered FCF

-68

-21

-2

33

109

Table 1.2 Financial summary — sponsor revenue & EBITDA preserved; profit and cash flow independently re-underwritten. Negative figures shown in parentheses.

Key findingThis is an infrastructure J-curve — the sponsor shows only the stabilised end-point

The sponsor presents a net-profit line only for the stabilised Year-10 position. Re-underwriting the full ten years shows the reality of a green-field infrastructure build: net losses in Years 1–3 (about –$6m, –$9m and –$4m) as depreciation and financing run ahead of ramping revenue, turning to profit from Year 4 and reaching roughly $101m by Year 10.

Unlevered free cash flow is deeply negative early (about –$68m and –$40m in Years 1–2), and the business consumes around $143m of cumulative cash before turning cash-generative around Year 6–7. This J-curve, not the Year-10 snapshot, is what investors and lenders must underwrite, and it is why the equity base and the sizing of the funding are the central questions.

1.4 Why this is investable

  • Real, asset-backed trade flows: Revenue rests on physical mining, agricultural and FMCG freight, not speculative logistics technology.
  • Corridor-control strategy: Owning end-to-end corridor infrastructure, not isolated assets, builds a defensible, toll-like position.
  • Infrastructure-grade equity base: At 47% equity, the structure is built to absorb the J-curve, a genuine strength versus thinly-capitalised peers.
  • Strong stabilised economics: Mature EBITDA margins of 30%+ and a terminal enterprise value the sponsor puts at $1.05–1.25bn.
  • Development-finance alignment: Regional integration, trade facilitation, rail revival and lower logistics costs sit squarely on DFI mandates.

1.5 Returns & the two caveats

On the re-underwritten cash flows, the Project generates a base-case project IRR of approximately 28% (27% on a conservative terminal), comfortably clearing the sponsor’s 11.5% cost of capital and meeting or exceeding the stated 19–24% target. The re-underwritten exit equity value of roughly $770m corroborates the sponsor’s $800–950m range.

Analyst flagTwo caveats define this transaction — and neither is the equity

Unusually for a plan of this type, the equity is not the concern, at 47%, it is a strength. The two real caveats are: first, capital adequacy, reaching $550m of revenue (and the sponsor’s own ~$55m of Year-10 depreciation, which implies an asset base far larger than $180m) requires materially more capital than the stated $180m; the $180m funds Phases 1–2 and the early trough with only modest headroom, and the full continental build depends on substantial reinvested cash flow and, in all likelihood, further capital raises. Second, rail-concession dependency, the “rail-first” economics depend on state rail operators the Company does not control. These two issues, not the balance-sheet structure, are where diligence should concentrate.