Crownstone College Group Business Plan — Debt Service, Cover Ratios & Returns

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Section 18 · 19 of 21

Debt Service, Cover Ratios & Returns

This section assesses the plan from the perspectives that matter most to lenders and equity investors: debt-service cover, capital efficiency, and risk-adjusted returns, with the enrolment ramp as the central sensitivity and the mature-campus terminal value as the principal source of return.

Debt-service cover — the early-year gap

Metric

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

CFADS

-13

15

43

64

97

Debt service

18

38

42

43

72

DSCR (x)

-0.74x

0.39x

1.02x

1.49x

1.35x

Net debt / EBITDA (x)

n/m

15.6x

8.2x

5.0x

3.0x

ROCE

-2.6%

-1.0%

1.0%

3.4%

6.5%

Figure 26. Debt profile and debt-service cover ratio

Analyst flagDebt cannot be serviced from operations in Years 1–3 — this must be structured for

This is the most important finding for lenders. Because EBITDA is negative in Year 1 and thin thereafter, the debt-service cover ratio is below 1.0x throughout Years 1–3 (–0.74x, 0.39x and 1.02x). The campus simply cannot service its debt from operations during the ramp. The financing must therefore be structured with a principal grace period through the ramp (modelled) and a ring-fenced debt-service reserve, funded from the raise, to meet interest until enrolment reaches the roughly 1,500-learner break-even. This is normal for a school start-up, but it is non-negotiable: a lender underwriting this plan on steady-state cover ratios alone would mis-price the early-year risk.

Figure 27. Return on capital employed

Returns over the 15-year horizon

The returns are long-dated by nature. Over the 15-year investment horizon, our independently re-derived model produces a project IRR of about 19.0% and an equity IRR of about 22.1%, closely corroborating the sponsor’s stated 18.7% and 22.9%. The five-year window captures only the J-curve trough and early ramp; the value accrues as the campus fills toward 2,800 learners and is realised at exit. The mature campus generates roughly R364m of EBITDA at a ~32% margin, and an 11x EV/EBITDA exit, in line with listed education comparables, implies an enterprise value around R5.7 billion. The return is patient and terminal-value-driven; it is not a near-term cash return.

Figure 28. Project and equity IRR over the 15-year horizon

NoteThe returns corroborate the sponsor — but are exit-multiple- and horizon-dependent

Our re-derived equity IRR of about 22% sits just below the sponsor’s 22.9%, and the project IRR of about 19% just above the sponsor’s 18.7%, a reassuring corroboration. Two honest caveats attach. First, the return is long-dated: it depends on holding through the full 15-year fill-to-maturity, and an investor needing liquidity earlier would realise far less, since the five-year window is the trough. Second, the equity value is dominated by the terminal exit multiple; at a more conservative 10x the return falls, at 12–13x it rises, as the sensitivity grid shows. We note too that the sponsor’s stated NPV of R512m appears conservative relative to its own 22.9% IRR, our internally consistent model implies a higher NPV, driven by the mature-campus terminal value.

Enrolment-ramp sensitivity — the central variable

The enrolment ramp is the dominant driver of the return. The table and chart below show the equity IRR as the whole ramp is scaled up or down against plan. A slower ramp deepens and lengthens the J-curve, delays break-even, and increases the funding need before the campus reaches the utilisation at which it becomes strongly cash-generative.

Enrolment ramp vs plan

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

Equity IRR

20.0%

21.1%

22.1%

22.2%

22.2%

Figure 29. Equity IRR sensitivity to the enrolment ramp
Figure 30. Equity IRR sensitivity to key drivers (tornado)

Three-case scenario analysis

Framing the decision as three underwriteable cases is instructive. A slow-ramp case (enrolment at 80% of plan, exited at a conservative 10x) still clears the discount rate; the base case (the sponsor plan at 11x) returns about 22%; an upside case (full ramp at 13x) is higher still. The return is resilient across the band, because the terminal value anchors it, but the near-term cash and debt-service risk is acute in the slow-ramp case, and it is that early-year risk, not the long-run IRR, that the structure must protect against.

Slow ramp

Base

Upside

Scenario

80% ramp, 10x exit

Sponsor plan, 11x

Full ramp, 13x exit

Equity IRR

19%

22%

23%

Assessment

Above hurdle, cash-tight

Attractive

Strong

Figure 31. Equity IRR — slow-ramp, base and upside

Two-dimensional sensitivity — enrolment ramp and exit multiple

Because the value is terminal-value-driven, the two variables that matter most are the enrolment ramp (which sets the mature EBITDA) and the exit multiple (which capitalises it). The grid below shows equity IRR across both simultaneously. A slow ramp exited at a low multiple is the genuine downside corner; a full ramp exited at a premium multiple is the upside.

Ramp \\ Exit x

10.0x

11.0x

12.0x

13.0x

80% ramp

19%

20%

21%

21%

90% ramp

20%

21%

22%

22%

100% ramp

21%

22%

23%

23%

110% ramp

22%

22%

23%

23%

120% ramp

22%

22%

23%

23%

The base case, full ramp at an 11x exit, sits mid-grid at about 22%. The IRR is relatively resilient to the ramp because the terminal value dominates and enrolment is capped at capacity, but the exit multiple is a material swing factor. The deeper truth the grid understates is timing: the IRR figures assume the ramp eventually completes; a ramp that stalls below capacity, rather than merely starting slower, would compress the mature EBITDA and the terminal value together, which is why filling the campus, not just opening it, is the objective to underwrite.

Break-even and the path to profitability

Two thresholds matter. Enrolment break-even, the point at which fee revenue covers the fixed cost base and the campus produces positive operating cash, sits at roughly 1,500 learners, which the plan reaches in Year 4. Net-profit break-even, after full depreciation and interest, follows in Year 5. Below break-even the campus consumes cash and relies on the raise and reserves; above it, each additional learner contributes at a high incremental margin, which is what drives the steep climb toward steady-state economics. The distance between opening enrolment (650) and break-even (1,500), roughly three years of ramp, is the window the financing structure must fund and protect.

Indicative covenant package

The plan is structured to sit within an education project-finance covenant package designed for the ramp, with the early-year debt-service gap managed through a grace period and a funded reserve rather than steady-state cover tests.

Covenant / structural feature

Indicative level

Rationale

Principal grace period

Through Years 1–3

Debt not serviceable from operations during the ramp

Debt-service reserve

12 months’ interest, funded at close

Meets interest until break-even enrolment

Standby / contingency facility

Committed alongside term debt

Protects against a slower ramp — sector precedent

Minimum DSCR (steady state)

≥ 1.30x from Year 5

Applies once the campus passes break-even

Enrolment covenant

Monitored vs plan

Early-warning trigger on the central risk

Dividend lock-up

Until enrolment & cover tests met

Retains cash through the build

Valuation and exit

The base case applies an 11x EV/EBITDA exit multiple to the mature-campus EBITDA of roughly R364m (at ~2,800 learners and a ~32% margin), implying an enterprise value around R5.7 billion. An 11x multiple reflects the level at which stable, long-duration, inflation-linked education assets trade — the listed comparables being Curro and ADvTECH, and it is an assumption the plan is candid about, with the sensitivity grid showing how returns move at 10–13x. Four credible exit routes support liquidity: a JSE listing on the education counter (for which the governance framework is built), a strategic acquisition by an established education group, a secondary sale to an infrastructure or education-focused fund, or a long-term hold generating stable dividends. The scarcity and quality of the campus asset add strategic value that acquirers of premium education platforms consistently pay for.

Exit metric

Value

Mature-campus EBITDA (~Year 9)

~R364m

Exit multiple (EV/EBITDA)

11.0x

Implied enterprise value

~R5,687m

Implied equity value (net of debt)

~R5,687m

Project IRR (15-yr)

~19.0%

Equity IRR / MOIC (15-yr)

~22.1% / ~13.7x

Financing process and next steps

  • Mandate & structuring of the R350m debt facility (DFI + bank) with a grace period, a funded debt-service reserve and a committed standby facility.
  • Enrolment & market due diligence to validate the ramp assumptions against the catchment’s high-income demand and competitor supply.
  • Construction & cost certainty fixed-price contracts and an independent quantity surveyor to contain the R850m build within budget and schedule.
  • Equity close of R500m ahead of first drawdown, with staged, milestone-linked debt disbursement tied to construction and enrolment.