Kasi Kicks Business Plan — Investment Analysis

The project and equity returns, the exit assumption behind them, and what the numbers do and do not support.

Investment Analysis

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  • 9.1 Returns
  • 9.2 What the return depends on
  • 9.3 What would improve it

9.1 Returns

Measure

Base case

Comment

Total funding requirement

R16 130 000

Fit-out, systems, opening stock and working capital

Capital invested in the project

R13 730 000

Excluding the working capital line, which flows through the model

Promoter and investor equity

R10 300 000

63.9% of the funding requirement

Project internal rate of return

39.4%

Five years plus a terminal value at 5.0x EBITDA

Return to equity

40.1%

After debt service and facility movement

Net present value at 15%

R19 367 480

Positive

Net present value at 18%

R15 608 495

Positive

Net present value at 22%

R11 397 346

Positive

Payback period

5.1 years

On unlevered project cash flow

Terminal value

R51 544 550

5.0x Year 5 EBITDA

Cumulative profit after tax, Years 1 to 5

R10 280 036

Turns positive during Year 4

Cumulative project cash flow before terminal value
Figure 20. Cumulative project cash flow before terminal value.

A project return of 39.4 per cent and an equity return of 40.1 per cent clear a fifteen per cent hurdle by a wide margin, and net present value remains positive at a 22 per cent discount rate. Two features drive that: the capital requirement is modest relative to the revenue it supports, and contribution of R470 a pair is high once the fixed base is covered.

9.2 What the return depends on

Project return under alternative exit assumptions
Figure 21. Project return under alternative exit assumptions.

Exit multiple of Year 5 EBITDA

Terminal value (R)

Project IRR

Equity IRR

3.5x

36 081 185

31.9%

31.2%

4.0x

41 235 640

34.6%

34.4%

5.0x

51 544 550

39.4%

40.1%

6.0x

61 853 460

43.6%

45.0%

7.0x

72 162 370

47.4%

49.3%

9.3 What would improve it

Lever

Effect on Year 5 EBITDA

Assessment

Average selling price 6% higher

+R4 514 231

Constrained by recommended pricing and by what the market bears

Units sold 12% higher

+R3 313 413

Trading density is already demanding at R83 358 per m²

Full-price sell-through 8 points higher

+R3 310 338

Largely a consequence of the size curve rather than an independent lever

Landed cost 8% lower

+R3 199 550

Requires buying power the group does not yet have

Size curve discipline 5 points better

+R2 069 023

Entirely within management’s control, and resourced from Year 1

Fixed costs 10% lower

+R1 669 433

The weakest lever; cutting store payroll damages conversion

Three of these six levers are effectively outside management’s control: recommended pricing is set by the brands, landed cost reflects buying power the group does not yet have, and trading density is already demanding. The two that are controllable — sell-through and the size curve — are not independent of one another, and together they account for 29.8 per cent of the total sensitivity swing. That is where the management attention belongs.