Kasi Kicks Business Plan — Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
What moves Year 5 EBITDA: pairs sold, average selling price, markdown rate and allocation, with downside and upside scenarios.
Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
Jump to section
- Overview & contents
- i. Important Notice and Basis of Preparation
- 1. Allocation: What You Are Allowed to Sell
- 2. Executive Summary
- 3. The Size Curve: Where Footwear Margin Is Lost
- 4. The Store and the Channel
- 5. SWOT and Competitive Position
- 6. Organisation and Compliance
- 7. Financial Plan
- 8. Break-Even and Debt Service
- 9. Investment Analysis
- 10. Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
- 11. Risk Analysis
- 12. Implementation Roadmap
- 13. Key Performance Indicators
- 14. Key Assumptions
- 15. Conclusion and Recommendation
- A. Appendix A: Consolidated Financial Summary
- B. Appendix B: Allocation, Size Curve and Store Schedules
- C. Appendix C: Funding, Debt and Stock Schedules
- D. Appendix D: Risk Register
- E. Appendix E: Glossary
- 10.1 What moves EBITDA
- 10.2 Scenarios
- 10.3 The downside: poor allocation and a broken size curve
- 10.4 Where the plan is deliberately conservative
10.1 What moves EBITDA
|
Driver |
Downside (R) |
Upside (R) |
Swing (R) |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Average selling price ±6% |
5 794 678 |
14 823 141 |
9 028 463 |
|
Units sold ±12% |
6 995 497 |
13 622 323 |
6 626 826 |
|
Full-price sell-through ±8 points |
6 998 572 |
13 619 248 |
6 620 676 |
|
Landed cost ±8% |
7 109 360 |
13 508 460 |
6 399 100 |
|
Size curve discipline ±5 points of sell-through |
8 239 887 |
12 377 933 |
4 138 046 |
|
Fixed costs ±10% |
8 639 477 |
11 978 343 |
3 338 866 |
|
Base case Year 5 EBITDA |
10 308 910 |
10.2 Scenarios
|
Downside |
Base |
Upside |
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
Volume assumption |
-14% |
As modelled |
+10% |
|
Price assumption |
-5% |
As modelled |
+4% |
|
Landed cost assumption |
+7% |
As modelled |
-3% |
|
Year 1 EBITDA |
(2 284 642) |
(1 144 734) |
(260 192) |
|
Year 3 EBITDA |
(1 082 663) |
4 420 064 |
8 693 425 |
|
Year 5 EBITDA |
850 151 |
10 308 910 |
17 658 485 |
|
Year 5 EBITDA margin |
1.1% |
13.7% |
23.5% |
|
Cumulative EBITDA, Years 1 to 5 |
(4 416 613) |
23 133 530 |
44 533 352 |
10.3 The downside: poor allocation and a broken size curve
A group in that position does not fail suddenly. Stock is realisable, the leases can be exited at a cost, and a two-store business can be run profitably by an owner who buys well. What is lost is the chain — the central function, the planner, the online channel and the growth case that justified the equity. That is the realistic downside: not insolvency, but reversion to a good independent shop that returns very little to an outside investor.
10.4 Where the plan is deliberately conservative
|
Assumption |
Treated in the base case as |
What is left on the table |
|---|---|---|
|
Allocation improving with sell-through history |
Held flat at 4% limited and 26% premium general release |
Brands allocate on history. Two seasons of strong sell-through should improve the mix, and the plan assumes none of it |
|
Stock turns |
Held at 4.2 against an industry median near 4.4 |
Reaching the median would release roughly R450 000 of working capital at maturity |
|
Full-price sell-through |
Held flat at 73% across five years |
A team that learns the curve should improve on its first-season buy; no learning effect is modelled |
|
Online share of units |
18% by Year 5 |
South African e-commerce is growing faster than that, and click and collect drives store footfall as well |
|
A fifth store |
Not modelled |
The central function is fully carried by four stores; a fifth would add contribution against almost no incremental overhead |
|
Terminal value |
5.0x Year 5 EBITDA |
A substantial part of the value is realisable stock, which sets a floor most specialist retail does not have |
None of these is included in the base case and none should be relied on. They are listed because a reader comparing this plan against a more optimistic one should know which direction the conservatism runs. The most material is the first: allocation is modelled as static across five years, when in practice it is the reward for exactly the sell-through discipline the plan is built around. If the size-curve work delivers, the range should improve — and the range improving is worth more than any of the other five.