Kyalami Surface Business Plan — Go-to-Market Strategy
Building retail demand and the trade channel, which grows from 16% to 34% of revenue by FY32.
Section 12 of 31
Go-to-Market Strategy
Jump to section
- i. Important Notice and Basis of Preparation
- 1. Executive Summary
- 2. Investment Thesis
- 3. Company and Business Overview
- 4. Problem, Customer Need and Value Proposition
- 5. Products and Services
- 6. Industry Analysis
- 7. Market Analysis
- 8. Customer Analysis
- 9. Competitive Landscape
- 10. Business Model
- 11. Go-to-Market Strategy
- 12. Operating Model
- 13. Management and Organisation
- 14. Strategic Plan
- 15. SWOT Analysis
- 16. Risk Analysis
- 17. ESG and Sustainability
- 18. Implementation Roadmap
- 19. Financial Plan: Assumptions
- 20. Projected Income Statement
- 21. Projected Balance Sheet
- 22. Projected Cash Flow
- 23. Capital Expenditure and Working Capital
- 24. Funding Requirement and Structure
- 25. Break-even Analysis
- 26. Investment Case and Returns
- 27. Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
- 28. Key Performance Indicators and Management Dashboard
- 29. Conclusion
- 30. Appendices
Fill the schedule three weeks forward at the highest available revenue per installer-hour — not maximise enquiries.
The commercial objective of this business is unusual and worth stating precisely. It is not to maximise demand: demand is not the constraint. It is to fill a fixed and perishable stock of installer-hours with the highest-value work available, far enough in advance that no bay stands idle and no collection date is missed.
Channel strategy
Table 15. Channels and their role in filling capacity
|
Channel |
Role |
Economics |
FY32 share |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Search and digital |
Primary retail acquisition; high-intent enquiries |
Cost per acquisition roughly R700; no commission |
26% |
|
Referral and reputation |
Highest-quality retail source; converts at over 50% |
Effectively zero acquisition cost |
18% |
|
Franchise dealer groups |
Contracted volume; smooths seasonal troughs |
11% referral commission; 45-day terms |
22% |
|
Fleet and corporate tender |
Fills January and February capacity |
Lowest margin; contracted and schedulable |
21% |
|
Enthusiast community and events |
Brand building; disproportionate referral influence |
Event and sponsorship cost; no commission |
13% |
Commercial funnel
The funnel below is calibrated to FY32 and reconciles to the 1,920 jobs the model schedules in that year. It is presented so that the assumptions can be tested rather than accepted.
Table 16. FY32 commercial funnel
Reconciles to modelled FY32 job volume.
|
Stage |
Volume |
Conversion |
Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Qualified enquiries |
7,680 |
— |
Digital, referral, walk-in and trade |
|
Quotations issued |
4,608 |
60% |
Not all enquiries reach quotation |
|
Bookings confirmed |
2,304 |
50% |
Deposit taken at confirmation |
|
Jobs completed |
1,920 |
83% |
Cancellations and reschedules |
|
Ancillary attachment |
1,190 |
62% |
Ceramic, film or correction added |
|
Revenue |
R42.0m |
Per financial model |
Pricing strategy
The Company prices at a published list, at a premium of approximately 15% to 25% over the independent studio archetype and at a multiple of the informal operator. Discounting is restricted to the trade channel and to defined multi-service bundles. List prices escalate at 6.0% per annum in the model — CPI plus 1.5 percentage points — reflecting both input cost escalation and the pricing power that brand and capacity confer.
|
Price pass-through is lagged, and the lag is a real exposure Published price lists and dealer contracts cannot be reset instantly. Management assumes a four to six month lag between a currency move and a corresponding price adjustment. In a sharp depreciation, the Company therefore absorbs roughly two quarters of margin compression before it can recover. Section 29 quantifies this: at 14% annual depreciation, FY32 EBITDA falls from R8.6m to R3.7m. |