Kyalami Surface Business Plan — Conclusion
What the numbers support, what they do not, and the terms on which the plan recommends proceeding.
Section 30 of 31
Conclusion
Jump to section
- i. Important Notice and Basis of Preparation
- 1. Executive Summary
- 2. Investment Thesis
- 3. Company and Business Overview
- 4. Problem, Customer Need and Value Proposition
- 5. Products and Services
- 6. Industry Analysis
- 7. Market Analysis
- 8. Customer Analysis
- 9. Competitive Landscape
- 10. Business Model
- 11. Go-to-Market Strategy
- 12. Operating Model
- 13. Management and Organisation
- 14. Strategic Plan
- 15. SWOT Analysis
- 16. Risk Analysis
- 17. ESG and Sustainability
- 18. Implementation Roadmap
- 19. Financial Plan: Assumptions
- 20. Projected Income Statement
- 21. Projected Balance Sheet
- 22. Projected Cash Flow
- 23. Capital Expenditure and Working Capital
- 24. Funding Requirement and Structure
- 25. Break-even Analysis
- 26. Investment Case and Returns
- 27. Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
- 28. Key Performance Indicators and Management Dashboard
- 29. Conclusion
- 30. Appendices
A well-structured operating business in a genuinely underserved market, offered on terms that limit the downside but cannot eliminate it.
South Africa’s premium vehicle parc is growing and its professional appearance-protection capacity is not. The incumbents are good craftsmen with no capacity and no brand, or good brands with variable craft. The gap is real, it is structural, and it is not closing on its own because closing it requires capital that owner-operators do not have and organisational capability that they have not built.
Kyalami Surface Company proposes to close it with R16.6m, two studios and thirteen certified installers. On the base case the result is a business earning R8.6m of EBITDA on R42.0m of revenue by FY32, generating an indicative 35.2% return to the institutional investor.
The three things that matter
- Utilisation is the plan. At 76% the investment works; at 68% it earns nothing; at 58% it is a loss. Every other variable in the model is secondary to this one, and it is knowable within fourteen months.
- The tranche 2 gate is the principal protection. It converts the central risk from a loss into a decision, and it is the reason an investor’s realistic worst case is R7.5m rather than R11.5m.
- The return is created late and realised on exit. This is not a yield investment and it is not a quick one. An investor requiring distributions before Year 4, or unable to commit to a five-year hold, is not the right holder of this equity.
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Management’s own view of the investment The Company believes this is a good business and a demanding investment, and it has written this document to make both halves of that statement visible. The unflattering findings — a negative project NPV on the explicit forecast period alone, return on capital below the cost of capital until Year 4, a downside case that impairs the equity, unhedgeable currency exposure beyond twelve months, and a film waste stream with no disposal solution — are stated in the body of the plan rather than in an appendix. An investment committee that reaches a negative decision on this document will at least have reached it on the correct facts. That is the standard the Company has tried to meet. |