Cleaning at 33% of revenue divided by R38,000 per megawatt implies 1,208 MW of cleaning contracts, which with the full-service share implies roughly 1,655 MW against 1,250 MW stated, a gap of about 405 MW. Holding capacity constant, the mix consistent with the price list is nearer 67% full-service and 19% cleaning. Because contribution margins differ by line, the mix and the margin trajectory must be restated on a consistent basis.

The stated 3.9× reconciles neither to whole-equity value at exit (6.3×) nor to the 41% that the shareholding table attributes to incoming investors (2.6×). This is the most consequential disclosure gap in the document; the return cannot be assessed without it.

R6 million covers 2.7 times net working capital in year one but 0.49 times by year five and 0.32 times by year seven. Growth becomes increasingly self-funded from cash that would otherwise support distributions or the De Aar and Gqeberha depots. The facility should scale with the contracted book.

The implied utility fleet of roughly 6,364 MW sits well above the operational base of approximately 2.3 to 3.5 GW, while the implied commercial fleet of 5,862 MW sits below the actual 8.3 GW of rooftop. If the near-term opportunity is more heavily commercial than assumed, blended margin comes under more pressure and many more, smaller contracts are required for the same megawatt total.

R18.6 million is committed within three months and 82% within twelve, largely ahead of proof that contracts can be won at 250 to 320 MW a year. Tranching against contracted-capacity milestones would align capital release with risk retirement.

Shareholders’ equity differs from the raise accumulated with retained profits by up to R2.6 million. The movements are consistent with issue costs, trust accounting or share-based payment, but they are unexplained and an investor reconciling the statements will notice.