SA Best Peanut Butter Business Plan — Investment Analysis

The project and equity returns, the DFI facility in the structure, and what the numbers do and do not support.

Investment Analysis

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  • 9.1 Returns
  • 9.2 Sensitivity of the return to the exit assumption
  • 9.3 What the return depends on

9.1 Returns

Measure

Base case

Comment

Total funding requirement

R74 120 000

Plus a R26 000 000 working capital facility

Capital invested in the project

R57 720 000

Capital expenditure plus non-working-capital pre-operational cost

Promoter and investor equity

R33 120 000

44.7% of the funding requirement

Project internal rate of return

15.5%

Unlevered, five years plus a terminal value at 7.0x EBITDA

Return to equity

12.6%

After debt service and facility movement

Net present value at 12%

R11 068 922

Positive

Net present value at 15%

R1 371 884

Marginal

Net present value at 18%

(R6 893 839)

Negative

Payback period

8.8 years

On unlevered project cash flow; well beyond the projection

Terminal value

R122 299 107

7.0x Year 5 EBITDA

Cumulative project cash flow before terminal value

(R51 125 699)

The return is realised on the terminal position

Assessed loss carried forward at Year 5

R17 519 710

A real shelter against Year 6 and Year 7 earnings, not valued here

Cumulative project cash flow before terminal value
Figure 20. Cumulative project cash flow before terminal value.

9.2 Sensitivity of the return to the exit assumption

Project return under alternative exit assumptions
Figure 21. Project return under alternative exit assumptions.

Exit multiple of Year 5 EBITDA

Terminal value (R)

Project IRR

Equity IRR

5.0x

87 356 505

8.9%

-0.2%

6.0x

104 827 806

12.4%

6.9%

7.0x

122 299 107

15.5%

12.6%

8.0x

139 770 408

18.3%

17.4%

9.0x

157 241 709

20.8%

21.5%

The base case applies seven times Year 5 EBITDA, which is consistent with branded food assets in a defensive category. At five times the project returns 11.6 per cent; at nine times it returns 18.5 per cent. The multiple is doing a great deal of work here, and what it is really pricing is the durability of the own-brand shelf position and the credibility of the food safety record. A manufacturer with five years of clean release data in a category that has recalled twice in two years is worth a materially different multiple from one without it.

9.3 What the return depends on

Lever

Effect on Year 5 EBITDA

Assessment

Selling prices 8% higher

+R12 401 200

The largest lever, and largely a function of mix and listing quality

Kernel price 12% lower

+R8 810 700

Outside the plant’s control; a groundnut rebate would deliver it

Volume 15% higher

+R6 028 484

Capacity exists on two shifts; the constraint is listings, not plant

Own-brand mix 10 points higher

+R2 691 800

The most controllable lever, and the one the plan is built around

Intake rejection 3 points lower

+R2 220 950

Supplier qualification. Rejecting bad kernels is expensive; buying from suppliers who send them is worse

Conversion cost 12% lower

+R1 739 350

The weakest lever, and R890 a tonne of it is testing that must not be cut

Two observations follow. The largest levers — price and kernel cost — are the two the plant least controls, which is the signature of a spread business. And the most controllable lever, own-brand mix, is worth R5 454 550 across the range tested, which is why the sales function and the listing budget are funded from launch rather than deferred until the plant is running.