SA Best Peanut Butter Business Plan — Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
What moves Year 5 EBITDA: kernel price, volume, selling price and own-brand mix, with downside and upside scenarios.
Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
Jump to section
- Overview & contents
- i. Important Notice and Basis of Preparation
- 1. Executive Summary
- 2. Aflatoxin: The Question That Defines the Business
- 3. Market, Products and Pricing
- 4. Regulation and Food Safety
- 5. SWOT and Competitive Position
- 6. Operations
- 7. Financial Plan
- 8. Break-Even and Debt Service
- 9. Investment Analysis
- 10. Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
- 11. Risk Analysis
- 12. Implementation Roadmap
- 13. Key Performance Indicators
- 14. Key Assumptions
- 15. Conclusion and Recommendation
- A. Appendix A: Consolidated Financial Summary
- B. Appendix B: Volume, Kernel and Cost Schedules
- C. Appendix C: Funding, Debt and Working Capital Schedules
- D. Appendix D: Risk Register
- E. Appendix E: Glossary
- 10.1 What moves EBITDA
- 10.2 Scenarios
- 10.3 The downside: a plant that cannot fill itself
10.1 What moves EBITDA
|
Driver |
Downside (R) |
Upside (R) |
Swing (R) |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Selling prices ±8% |
5 074 401 |
29 872 501 |
24 798 100 |
|
Kernel price ±12% |
8 660 601 |
26 282 001 |
17 621 400 |
|
Volume ±15% |
11 442 817 |
23 499 785 |
12 056 968 |
|
Own-brand mix ±10 points |
14 708 551 |
20 163 101 |
5 454 550 |
|
Intake rejection ±3 points |
15 108 451 |
19 692 251 |
4 583 800 |
|
Conversion cost ±12% |
15 731 951 |
19 210 651 |
3 478 700 |
|
Base case Year 5 EBITDA |
17 471 301 |
Selling price and kernel cost occupy the top two positions and together swing EBITDA by R42 419 500 — more than the remaining four drivers combined. That is the signature of a spread business, and it is why Section 2 treats the kernel decision as the defining one rather than as a procurement detail.
10.2 Scenarios
|
Downside |
Base |
Upside |
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
Volume assumption |
-16% |
As modelled |
+10% |
|
Kernel price assumption |
+10% |
As modelled |
-5% |
|
Selling price assumption |
-5% |
As modelled |
+4% |
|
Year 1 EBITDA |
(9 580 119) |
(3 526 611) |
1 212 159 |
|
Year 3 EBITDA |
(6 038 467) |
7 500 683 |
18 098 291 |
|
Year 5 EBITDA |
(1 928 923) |
17 471 301 |
32 649 871 |
|
Year 5 EBITDA margin |
-1.2% |
10.8% |
20.2% |
|
Cumulative EBITDA, Years 1 to 5 |
(30 015 869) |
35 837 149 |
87 371 602 |
10.3 The downside: a plant that cannot fill itself
The distinction between the base case and the downside is not competence. It is three ordinary variables moving modestly against the plant at the same time — a drought that lifts kernel prices, a listing that does not convert, and a retailer that negotiates harder than assumed. Each is entirely plausible in isolation. That is the honest characterisation of the risk, and it is why the plan gates construction on 70 per cent of kernel supply contracted and half of Year 1 volume committed before a spade goes in the ground.