AetherGas Energy Business Plan — Returns, Scenarios & Sensitivity

Equity returns

Measure	Headline (7.0× exit)	Normalised (5.5× exit)
FY2031 EBITDA (R m)	1,950	1,950
Enterprise value at exit (R m)	13650	10725
Less net debt (R m)	(2119)	(2119)
Equity value (R m)	11531	8606
Equity invested (R m)	1,920	1,920
MOIC (×)	6.01×	4.48×
Equity IRR	65.7%	52.9%

Figure 25. *Equity value at exit under headline and normalised multiples.*

Both cases assume the full sponsor ramp is delivered on schedule. The independent re-derivation reproduces these returns exactly (project unlevered IRR ≈ 48.8% at a 14.5% WACC). The downside scenario still returns roughly 2.3× MOIC on materially longer duration, the equity case degrades gracefully rather than catastrophically, provided the standby funding exists to reach completion.

The gap between the ~49% unlevered project IRR and the ~66% levered equity IRR quantifies the contribution of the capital structure: sequenced, milestone-gated debt drawn against a de-risked asset amplifies equity returns without imposing debt service before the operating engine turns. The corollary is the exit dependency below, because interim distributions are modest through the grace period, the equity return is realised predominantly at exit, which is why duration flexibility and a credible menu of exit routes are integral to the equity case rather than incidental to it.

Exit routes

Trade sale to a global industrial-gas major (Air Liquide, Linde, Air Products, Messer), the most probable route; helium reserves are strategic scarcity assets these buyers have paid premium multiples to control.
Energy-major acquisition (Shell, TotalEnergies-class), fits gas-and-transition portfolios seeking African growth with hard-currency export earnings.
JSE listing — the Renergen precedent proves public-market access; credible from FY2031 once two years of positive EBITDA are printed.
Infrastructure-fund recapitalisation — post-ramp contracted midstream cash flows suit core-plus buyers, enabling partial early liquidity via a MidCo stake sale.

Scenario analysis

Parameter	Downside	Base	Upside
Volume ramp	−28% (12-mo delay)	Sponsor plan	+15% (faster hook-ups)
EBITDA margin shift	−4 pts	As modelled	+2 pts
FY2031 revenue (R m)	3,312	4,600	5,290
FY2031 EBITDA (R m)	1,272	1,950	2,348
Indicative equity IRR	≈24%	65.7%	≈78%
FY2031 DSCR	≈1.15×	1.82×	≈2.2×
Standby facility	Drawn (R350–450m)	Undrawn	Undrawn

Figure 26. *FY2031 EBITDA and equity IRR across downside, base and upside scenarios.*

Sensitivity tornado

Helium price and commissioning timing dominate the risk surface. A ±20% helium-price move swings equity IRR by roughly ±14 points; a 12-month commissioning delay costs ~12 points and, critically for lenders, pushes first helium revenue behind the first scheduled amortisation date, precisely the event the DSRA, sculpting and standby facility exist to absorb. Capex-overrun sensitivity (±15% ≈ ∓7 points) is contained by the vendor-wrapped EPC strategy but cannot be engineered to zero.

Figure 27. *Equity IRR sensitivity to key value drivers.*

Helium price deck and break-even resilience

Figure 28. *Helium price deck used across cases (US$/mcf, bulk liquid).*

The spread between the base and debt cases is the quantified cost of the sponsor’s optimism: roughly R240m of cumulative FY2028–31 helium revenue. Sizing senior debt off the debt-case deck, as this plan recommends, makes that optimism an equity option rather than a lender exposure. Resilience is structural: EBITDA breakeven at FY2029 requires only ~62% of planned revenue; debt service in FY2031 tolerates a 32% EBITDA shortfall before DSCR touches 1.0×; and helium alone at FY2031 volumes and US$350/mcf covers total FY2031 debt service ~2.3×.