Rosebank Workspace Business Plan — Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
What moves the outcome: occupancy, desk rate, lease escalation and centre timing, with scenarios.
Section 23 of 29
Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
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- i. Important Notice and Basis of Preparation
- 1. Executive Summary
- 2. Investment Thesis
- 3. Company and Business Overview
- 4. Problem, Customer Need and Value Proposition
- 5. Products and Services
- 6. Industry Analysis
- 7. Market Analysis and Sizing
- 8. Customer Analysis
- 9. Competitive Landscape
- 10. Business Model
- 11. Go-to-Market Strategy
- 12. Operating Model
- 13. Management and Organisation
- 14. Strategic Plan, FY2027 to FY2031
- 15. SWOT Analysis and Strategic Implications
- 16. Risk Analysis and Mitigation
- 17. ESG and Sustainability
- 18. Implementation Roadmap
- 19. Financial Model and Assumptions
- 20. Projected Financial Statements
- 21. Funding Requirement, Structure and Investment Returns
- 22. Sensitivity and Scenario Analysis
- 23. Key Performance Indicators and Management Dashboard
- 24. Conclusion and Recommendation
- A. Appendix A: Detailed Financial Statements
- B. Appendix B: FY2027 Monthly Operating and Cash Profile
- C. Appendix C: Assumption Register
- D. Appendix D: Glossary and Definitions
The base case works. The downside case does not: it produces a negative return and a funding gap of R2.8m. This section sets out both without softening either.
22.1 Scenario definitions
Table 69 Scenario assumptions
|
Variable |
Stress |
Downside |
Base |
Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Achieved rate versus plan |
−9.0% |
−4.0% |
Plan |
+4.5% |
|
Stabilised occupancy versus plan |
−16.0pp |
−8.0pp |
Plan |
+7.0pp |
|
Operating costs versus plan |
+7.0% |
+3.5% |
Plan |
−1.0% |
|
Narrative |
Sustained oversupply with a macroeconomic contraction |
Ramp materially slower than plan with competitive rate pressure |
Plan as modelled |
Faster absorption and firmer pricing |
22.2 Scenario outcomes
Table 70 Scenario outcomes
|
Measure |
Stress |
Downside |
Base |
Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
FY2031 revenue |
R57.2m |
R65.3m |
R73.4m |
R81.4m |
|
FY2031 EBITDA |
R-3.6m |
R5.4m |
R14.2m |
R22.2m |
|
FY2031 EBITDA margin |
-6.3% |
8.2% |
19.3% |
27.3% |
|
FY2031 net profit |
R-9.9m |
R-0.9m |
R8.8m |
R13.0m |
|
Minimum cash balance |
R-29.0m |
R0.2m |
R6.9m |
R15.4m |
|
Minimum debt service cover |
-1.29× |
-0.17× |
1.18× |
2.26× |
|
Additional funding required |
R32.0m |
R2.8m |
nil |
nil |
|
Equity value at exit |
R-70.7m |
R25.7m |
R122.0m |
R202.9m |
|
Money multiple |
-1.29× |
0.47× |
2.23× |
3.71× |
|
Equity IRR |
-95.0% |
-15.0% |
18.6% |
32.0% |
22.3 Single-variable sensitivity
Table 71 Single-variable sensitivity
|
Variable |
FY2031 EBITDA (R m) |
FY2031 net profit (R m) |
Minimum DSCR |
Money multiple |
Equity IRR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Price -10% |
8.4 |
2.7 |
0.26× |
1.10× |
2.0% |
|
Price -5% |
11.3 |
6.1 |
0.74× |
1.68× |
11.6% |
|
Price +5% |
17.1 |
11.6 |
1.61× |
2.78× |
24.3% |
|
Occupancy -10percentage points |
5.7 |
-0.6 |
-0.12× |
0.54× |
-12.3% |
|
Occupancy -5percentage points |
9.9 |
4.7 |
0.50× |
1.41× |
7.5% |
|
Occupancy +5percentage points |
18.4 |
12.0 |
1.82× |
3.03× |
26.5% |
|
Opex +10% |
11.2 |
6.0 |
0.65× |
1.64× |
11.0% |
|
Opex -5% |
15.7 |
10.3 |
1.43× |
2.53× |
21.7% |
|
Base case |
14.2 |
8.8 |
1.18× |
2.23× |
18.6% |
Occupancy is the dominant variable. A six-point shortfall removes R4.2m of FY2031 EBITDA and reduces the equity IRR to 7.5%; a twelve-point shortfall produces a negative return. Price is the second most important variable: a ten percent rate reduction leaves the business solvent but reduces the IRR to 2.0%, below any reasonable cost of equity. Operating costs matter least, a ten percent overrun on all operating costs costs less than a six-point occupancy shortfall, which is why the commercial priority set out in Section 14.2 is to defend occupancy even at the expense of cost discipline.
22.4 Combined price and occupancy sensitivity
The two dominant variables are correlated in practice: an operator facing weak absorption discounts to fill space, so a rate shortfall and an occupancy shortfall tend to arrive together. The grid below tests them jointly. The shaded region, combinations producing an IRR below 12%, is uncomfortably large, and defines the zone within which the Company would need to revisit its expansion plan rather than proceed through the decision gates.
Table 72 Equity IRR across combined rate and occupancy outcomes
|
Rate versus plan |
Occupancy -12pp |
Occupancy -6pp |
Occupancy +0pp |
Occupancy +6pp |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
-8% |
-95.0% |
-12.9% |
6.3% |
17.2% |
|
-4% |
-34.2% |
-0.8% |
13.1% |
22.3% |
|
+0% |
-12.3% |
7.5% |
18.6% |
26.5% |
|
+4% |
-1.1% |
13.7% |
23.2% |
30.2% |
Source: Company financial model. Each cell is a full re-run of the sixty-month model with the balance sheet reconciling. The base case is the zero rate, zero occupancy cell.
22.5 Interest rate sensitivity
The model holds prime flat at 10.5% across the projection period. A 200 basis point increase would add approximately R0.8 million of cumulative finance cost across five years and reduce FY2030 debt service cover from 1.18× to approximately 1.09×, which would breach the proposed covenant. A 200 basis point reduction would add approximately R0.8 million of cumulative pre-tax profit and lift FY2030 cover to approximately 1.28×. Interest rate exposure is material to covenant compliance but immaterial to the investment return: the IRR moves by less than one point across a 400 basis point range, because the equity return is driven by the exit multiple rather than by cash accumulation.